PRA and design basis analyses (Appendix K) assumptions

Over-reliance on DBA assumptions is causing the nuclear industry to overstate the baseline CDF for the plants. The effect is to limit operational flexibility, and increase the burden on the regulator to keep the public health and safety risk as low as is reasonable. If the current generation of nuclear plants had a reported CDF similar to what is estimated for the IRIS plants (i.e., ~1E-08/year), could we end the hair pulling and cultivation of new rules? Could we replace out-dated (i.e., hard to replace) SSCs with other SSCs that take advantage of technological developments since the 1970s without arguing about the incremental reliability differences between analog and digital? Could we finally get to a state where surveillances and inspections were actually done to maximize the value of the capital assets at the plant? If it can be shown that the best estimate public health and safety risk from commercial nuclear power is on a par with IRIS, can we fall in love with nuclear power all over again?